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Abstract 
This paper focuses on the historical narrative of the establishment and development of corporate 
elite of Pakistan in almost twenty years which became a symbol of a success story to follow in 
those years. Literature cover this area under the concept of industrial development and resource 
allocation but less work is done on it with the Power Elite approach under political economy 
perspective. This paper argues that it is due to collusion and contestation of the existing elite of 
that time, that a new elite, Corporate, was established and then was nurtured by other elites to 
safe guard their own vested interest. The private investors who turn up to be big business groups 
within two decades used networking among themselves via family links and playing active role in 
politics. This act of developing corporate elites was aided by international affairs which in turn 
enhanced the economic and political influence of business groups. 
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Contribution of this paper to the literature 
This paper provides the success story of the corporate elite of Pakistan in early twenty years of 
the creation of Pakistan. It had theoretically proved the application of the Power Elite Theory 
of Mills (1956) on the real scenario of collusions and contestations among power elites of this 
part of the world and how it had given birth to a new Elite i-e, Corporate Elite. Who later on 
played a vital role in crafting the ruling elite of this society.   
 
1. Introduction 
There are two primary reasons for this focus on corporate elites. First, is the fast growth of this elite group in a 
country which had started with almost zero industrial heritage and infrastructure. Second is the ability of corporate 
elites to acquire control of 66 per cent of total industrial assets, 70 per cent of the insurance sector and 80 per cent 
of the banking industry within the first twenty years of Independence in 1947, a factor that changed the basic 
structure of the economy and political horizon of the country (Haq, 1976). A few corporate elites had contributed to 
the Pakistan movement, but how much their participation helped them to acquire top positions in the corporate 
sector has yet to be answered. For example, among the founders of the Muslim League there were a few Muslim 
manufacturers, the most notable being Adamjee Pirbhai Aga Khan1 (later elected as the first president of the 
League), despite being head of the Ismaili community2. He was closely connected to leading Muslim manufacturers 
in Bombay0 (Hussain, 1985). 
The other aspect to be investigated is how these corporate elites then utilized their influential position in 
society and government to further develop their corporate base. To create a complete picture of the development of 
the corporate sector, there is a need to understand how new business groups entered the corporate sector and went 
on to become major enterprises.3 
 
1.1. Corporate Elite 
Useem (1983) analyzed the corporate elite of America and Britain and defined them as those comprising men 
and (a few) women who were in a position to exercise a major influence on the decisions and policies of large 
companies. The early 1980s was a time when the governments of both countries followed a “supply side economics” 
philosophy and radical reductions in state social services and traditional safety nets. Useem’s work focuses on the 
resultant strategies and activities of the large corporations towards the government’s pro-business activities. He 
discussed in detail how corporate elites obtained power and then manipulated the governance of political parties in 
their own interest. He emphasized multiple in-house strategies opted by corporate elites in the shape of 
philanthropic activities and nonprofit organizations to sustain their strong stance and position in the society. These 
corporate elites whom he called an “inner circle”4 obtained the leadership of major business associations, own most 
of the media channels and financially support political parties and candidates. This study assesses the corporate 
elite of Pakistan under these domains.  
In Pakistan, corporate elites played a critical role at the time of independence and have been an important 
power source since then. However, the interesting thing about the corporate elites of Pakistan is the contestations 
among them. Analysts consider these contestations among the corporate elites of East and West Pakistan as the 
major reason for the division of the country in 1970 and the creation of Bangladesh. The corporate elites of West 
Pakistan had been so powerful and influential in policy decisions that it was not considered wrong when the East 
Bengal Professional Elite (EBPE) accused corporate elites of treating their province as a colony that could be 
exploited for its raw materials and resources (Ali, 2001).  
Pakistani corporate elites have been facing numerous internal and external issues. As emerging elites, they 
have always been under the social influence of bureaucrats and landlords. Being corporate people, their focus 
involved securing high profits; but they have been entangled in caste and class conflicts too. In an interview with 
me, one famous political analyst, Dr. Imran Ali, who has extensively studied business groups of Pakistan mentioned 
that corporate elites have always been involved in unproductive social competition with feudal lords who have long 
had a lavish life style, one they inherited from their ancestors. Pakistan is a society of social classes. Landlord elites 
historically are following a lifestyle of lavish living. Corporate elites, after securing good profits, strove to compete 
with each other and other elites by spending extended on lavish lifestyles. At the start of industrial development, 
such wasteful expenditure should not have been the case as the country needed reinvestment of profits in the 
industry rather than nonproductive expenditures.  
To win the race of extravagant lifestyles, Pakistan’s corporate elite tried to be in the limelight by spending 
extraordinary on lavish villas and cars, rather than industrial units. For example, during the development decade 
(1958-68), over US$300 million was spent on the import of private cars while US$20 million was spent on public 
transport. At that time private luxury housing accounted for 80-90 per cent of the construction that took place in 
the country (White, 1974). 
                                                          
1 The Adamjee group, though a corporate elite in the early days of Pakistan, lost its position and today is no longer among the top companies. In less than two decades, the Adamjee 
group established and managed over forty industrial and financial enterprises in East and West Pakistan, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Lebanon and the United Kingdom. In 1971, 
due to ethnic and social differences between East and West Pakistan, a civil war broke out. This ultimately resulted in the bifurcation of the East wing, leading to the creation of 
independent Bangladesh. The newly-formed socialist government of Bangladesh took control of all major industrial and financial institutions. The Adamjee family lost all its assets 
in Bangladesh and was compelled to shift its group headquarters to Karachi. On the Western front, the Group became the subject of public criticism following the propaganda of 
anti-trust laws concerning monopolistic business families of the country. As a consequence of this movement, a large segment of its assets in West Pakistan was also lost under 
Prime Minister Z.A. Bhutto's nationalization programs in 1974. Source: (http://www.adamjees.net/history.aspx) 
2 The Ismailis are the only Muslim business community working in the geographical area which later became Pakistan. Members of this group also have a business presence in 
Calcutta and Bombay.  
3  For example, the Jahangir Saddique Group, Schon Group and Best Way Group have been operating in the corporate sector for more  than 30 years and now are among the top in 
the list of industrialists. 
4 Useem identified the inner circle as those individuals who have been personally approached by senior government officials with a request for reactions to a “shortlist” of candidates 
for appointment to major advisory bodies or even top administrative posts. 
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According to Mahboob-ul-Haq, for all practical purposes, 22 families had become by 1968 both the planning 
commission and the ministry of finance for the private sector. They pre-empted most investment permits, import 
licenses, foreign credits and government patronage because they controlled or influenced most of the decision-
making forums handing out such permissions. They had virtually established a stranglehold over the system and 
were in a position to keep out new entrepreneurs. 
Ethnic disputes among corporate elites had not let them gain the economic position which they could have 
secured if they had worked together and with other elite groups. Such ethnic and social factors justified their shape 
till the 1980s. However, after this period when the local corporate elite had to face global competition, along with 
the neo-liberal policies of the government, how they responded to these issues and what new strategies were 
followed by those big corporate names has still not been researched. As Dr. Kaisar Bengali said in 2009, there had 
been no industrial policy for the last 30 years after the country was transformed from a developmental state to a 
security state5. This research focuses on these factors which had an impact on the corporate elite and how they 
sustained in it. 
 
1.2. Tools used by Corporate Elites 
Corporate elites around the world always use networks as a tool to collude with each other and other power 
elites to expand their profits and businesses.  Davis et al. (2003) did research the networking patterns of corporate 
elites and the stability of these ties. They found that the aggregate connectivity of the network is remarkably stable 
and appears to be an intrinsic property of the interlock network, resilient to major changes in corporate 
governance. They used concepts from “small world” analysis to explain their findings that the structure of the 
corporate elite is resilient to macro and micro changes affecting corporate governance.  
For networking analysis, the sample studied and considered by Mills (1956) was a small set of private schools, 
while Groton and Exeter provided an essential agency for socializing and organizing members of the upper class, 
and Mintz and Schwartz (1985) argued for a special role for money-center banks in knitting together corporate 
directors. Davis et al. (2003) suggest that the small-world organization of the corporate elite is an emergent 
property of networks-qua-networks and requires no coordinating mechanism. These scholars suggest that no 
specific mechanism is followed by corporate elites for networking and it keeps changing as per the events occurring 
in a country. The other school of thought involving the “old school boy” network argues that corporate elites in 
each society follow certain channels and networks to develop links and liaisons with others which are later useful 
for future progress (Bell, 1994; Schaede, 1995).  
Berle and Means (1932) explored the evolution of big business through the legal and economic lens and argued 
that in the modern world those who legally have ownership over companies have to be differentiated from those 
who control them. Later, Domhoff (1967) employed Berle and Means’ concept of ownership and control in his 
investigation of the corporate structure of America, specifically to trace the flow of power, through elite-based 
networks of the country. While studying Pakistan’s business groups’ ownership and control structure, it was found 
that as most of them are family business groups so control was with the major shareholders. The average 
shareholding by family members and the associated companies of the group came up to 30-35 per cent.  This makes 
the boards of directors who primarily constitute family members the major decision-makers and they control the 
managerial decisions as well.  
 
2. Corporate Elite as New Power Elite in Pakistan 
During the early years after its independence, Pakistan faced four crises that impaired its development: the war 
with India over Kashmir, communal rioting, urban destruction and a massive influx of refugees into West Pakistan 
(Wilcox, 1968). While these events were taking place, the corporate sector was in the process of reviving itself, 
following the migration to India of 80 percent of Karachi’s business giants who were Hindus. Ali and Malik (2009) 
note that in Lahore, out of 215 businesses, 167 were owned by non-Muslims and in Karachi 80 percent of land and 
all foreign trade were controlled by non-Muslims. Urban trade and commerce were managed by Hindus who 
migrated to India creating a serious gap in the areas of banking, insurance, education, trade and industry (Sharif, 
1966). Meanwhile, a majority of those who had migrated to Pakistan were small Muslim traders with little or no 
business experience.  
In 1947, out of a total 14,569 industrial establishments that existed in the subcontinent, only 1,406 units were 
in Pakistan (including the region which is now Bangladesh). Most of these industrial units were of little importance 
such as flour and rice mills and cotton ginning factories. There was also the serious problem of limited financial 
resources without which it was impossible to proceed with any kind of industrial development plan. To counter 
these problems, the government emphasized establishing export-oriented industrial enterprises. The two major 
hurdles in establishment of these enterprises were the lack of business-oriented human capital and the poor 
industrial infrastructure.  
Bureaucrats actively moved to resolve these problems. First, they tried to train and support businessmen with 
non-business backgrounds by establishing the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation (PIDC) and Pakistan 
Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation (PICIC). Shafqat (1999) and White (1974) argue that the 
establishment of PIDC and PICIC was a core factor that led to the creation of financial/industrial groups that came 
to be known as the “22 families” in the 1970s. According to White (1974) the top 43 groups listed on the Karachi 
Stock Exchange (Pluta and Frederiksen, 1980) received 11 of 43 businesses divested by the PIDC in East Pakistan 
and eight of 17 firms in West Pakistan. The big companies owned by these 22 families included Karnaphuli Paper 
Mills and Burewala Textile Mills (Dawood family), Jauharabad Sugar Mills (now Kohinoor Sugar Mills) (Saigol 
family), Karachi Gas Company (Fancy family), Charsada Sugar Mills (Hoti family), Adamjee Chemical Works, 
Adamjee Industries, Adamjee High Grade Paper and Board Mills, Nowshera and at least six jute mills which were 
built by WPIDC (West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation). 
                                                          
5 http://archives.dailytimes.com.pk/business/03-Mar-2009/ 
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Although East Pakistan contributed 70 percent of the total jute production of a united India, it lacked a well-
developed jute-processing enterprise. In West Pakistan, the major crop was cotton but only three processing firms 
existed in the region (Ali and Malik, 2009). The geographical area that came under Pakistan was only associated 
with the production of raw agricultural products. The processing firms that were established were in areas that 
remained with India after partition. Table 1 outlines the division of industrial units in 1942 in the areas which were 
separated as India and Pakistan. 
 
Table-1. Division of industrial units in India and Pakistan in 1942. 
Industrial units as per products India Pakistan 
Cotton 857 15 
Jute 3 0 
Sugar 176 15 
Paper mill 19 0 
Iron and steel works 36 0 
Glasswork 112 5 
Cement and lime works and potteries 57 8 
 Source: Eastern Economist (1942). 
 
These figures do not include small factories and workshops making light consumption goods, such as hosiery 
and knitwear, electrical fittings, rugs, shoes and leather goods, handicrafts in wool, silk, embroidery, in cities like 
Lahore. In these businesses, Pakistan was not badly under-represented. The single industry of any note was the 
production of sports goods in Sialkot in West Punjab (Spate, 1948). There was little prospect for industrialization 
except in agricultural-based industries such as cotton ginning and milling, flour, food processing and jute mills in 
Eastern Pakistan, though even here these enterprises were encountering serious difficulties. Considering the 
limited available options for creating an industrial sector, the business groups of that time focused on agricultural-
related industries such as the establishment of Dawood Cotton Mills in 1951. 
There were a few major Muslim-owned enterprises in the region. One of them was the Adamjee family, which 
had played a major role in the Pakistan movement, though largely in the form of behind-the-scenes financial 
support. Nevertheless, the absence of a business-oriented class provided immigrant Muslims an opportunity to 
invest in textile industries previously controlled by Hindus. In West Pakistan, the initial business movers after 
partition settled in Karachi as it was a port city and the hub of business activities. They chose not to settle in 
Punjab as the government selected this region to settle homeless migrants from India. 
In East Pakistan, migrant re-settlement was not an issue and the corporate elite of that area were Hindu 
Marwaris, Europeans and a few Bengali Muslims. Muslim migrants with business backgrounds settled in Karachi 
in spaces once occupied by a Hindu business class. They were mostly Memons from Gujarat (India) who belonged 
to the Sunni Muslim sect; they were extremely hard-working with a long history of involvement in business. 
Others included the Dawoodi Bohras from Bombay, the Khoja Ismailis from Bombay and East Africa and the Khoja 
Ishnashris, all of whom belonged to the Shia sect. The religious sects they belonged to continues to be a factor 
when it comes to decision-making in business ventures. A region which developed as a business centre after 
Karachi was Lyallpur, near Lahore (Punjab), where the Chinioties spearheaded business activities. Chiniot is a 
small town near Lyallpur (now renamed Faisalabad). The Chinioties started a textile industry as the major cash 
crop in Punjab was cotton. 
 
2.1. Pakistan’s Business History 
To understand the business history of Pakistan, it is necessary to determine the origins of these business 
groups from united India that emerged under British rule. Historians conventionally argue that the Indian 
capitalist class was more prone to collaborate with foreign capital and that they apparently faced “no major 
conflict” in adapting to its presence (Gardezi and Rashid, 1983; Ali, 2004; Bose and Jalal, 2004). Other historians 
challenge this as a neo-Marxist position, arguing that though Indian capitalists were weak and dependent, they 
struggled with imperialism and made use of crises in the world economy, such as the world wars and the Great 
Depression, to emerge as an independent force (Raman, 2014). The literature on business activities in India focuses 
on enterprises in Bombay and Calcutta. Among the business groups of prominence in Pakistan were those that had 
migrated from Bombay and Calcutta.  
In Pakistan, as in India, the industrialists were usually members of old trading families. These families continue 
to dominate Pakistan’s corporate sector. However, the method used to develop their enterprises was a legacy of the 
British, the “agency firm”6 (Lamb, 1955). Families like Adamjee, Valika and Habib were involved in trading, 
insurance and banking from the colonial period.  
Industrial capitalism was an unintended by-product of British economic and political policy. British presence in 
India was to capitalize on its raw materials. These materials were used for British products manufactured for 
export. To facilitate global trade, British needed ports, especially in Calcutta and Bombay. Calcutta was used for 
jute-related trade and Bombay for cotton-related products. The production areas for both these products later 
became Pakistan, but processing units were launched in Calcutta and Bombay as these cities had ports.  
The industrial groups in India belonged to different religions. Most of the groups were Hindus and Jains and 
the others were Christians, Muslims and Zoroastrians. Among these business groups, only two ethnic groups were 
involved in the cotton industry in the 1850s; they provided cotton to Bombay’s textile manufacturers. Those were 
the Parsis, who had migrated from Persia almost 1200 years ago and were a relatively small group, and the 
Gujratis, a subgroup of the larger Hindu community. These two groups were selected to control the cotton 
                                                          
6 The managing agency conducted extensive trading operations and ran industrial plants, about which no quantitative information is available. Some of these ventures were 
incorporated as “public” companies with listed shares on stock exchanges and were required to publish annual statements. A long-term contract between the managing agency and 
each related company allowed the agency to determine overall company policy and to intervene in day-to-day decisions. 
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industry due to their business knowledge and access to the ports, being residents of nearby areas. The Parsis had 
the advantage of being closer to British businesses because of their command of the English language.  
In 1854, C.N. Davar, a Parsi banker and trader with many British contacts, built the first cotton textile mill. It 
soon matched many other factories in Bombay and Gujarat. Later, the Parsi industrialist J.N. Tata and his family 
entered into heavy industries. Since then, Hindu and Parsi business interests expanded, gradually transitioning 
from trade to industry (Lamb, 1955). This is similar to the developments in Pakistan with the only difference being 
that the traditional industrial community were Hindus who upon migration to India were replaced by Muslim 
traders. Since they had no strong industrial and manufacturing experience, those groups with some measure of 
business experience like the Adamjee and Habib Groups captured much of the market in the emerging economy.  
The prominent elite groups who significantly participated in the Pakistan movement were landlords, educated 
secular urbanities and the commercial minorities. These commercial minorities became business groups by 
expanding their businesses in the first decade. Papanek (1962) explains that before 1947, 70 percent of industry 
owners belonged to the trade sector (buying and selling finished products and gaining a commission) but later 
became entrepreneurs. He also mentioned that 27 percent of the industrialists were Helai Memons who comprised 
only 0.3 percent of the total population.  
Prior to partition, most of the business groups that participated in the growth of Pakistan’s industry had their 
headquarters in Calcutta or Bombay. After partition, only three cities became the hub of all industrial activities: 
Karachi (a port city), Lyallpur (the city with a large number of manufacturing firms) and Lahore (the hub of 
Punjab). Inevitably, business families settled in these three cities. 40 percent of all industrial workers soon were to 
be found in these three cities. Table 2 details the background of the top business groups which either migrated to 
Pakistan in 1947 or were situated there well before partition.  
 
Table-2. Background of industrial families. 
Business group Community Family Origin/Area Settled HQ location pre 1947 
Adamjee Memon Kathiawar/ Jetpur Karachi Calcutta 
Dawood Memon Kathiawar/Bantwa Karachi Bombay 
Saigol Punjabi Shaikh West Punjab/ Chakwal Lahore Calcutta 
Valika Dawoodi/Bohra Bombay Karachi Bombay 
Colony PunjabiShaikh/ Chinioti West Punjab/ Chiniot Lahore Lahore 
Fancy Khoja Ismaili Kathiawar Karachi East Africa 
Bawany Memon Kathiawar/ Jetpur Karachi Rangoon 
Crescent Punjabi Shaikh/ Chinioti West Punjab/ Chiniot   Lyallpur Delhi 
Beco Punjabi East Punjab Lahore Batala 
Wazir Ali (None, Syed) West Punjab/ Lahore Lahore Lahore 
Amin Punjabi Shaikh West Punjab Karachi Calcutta 
Nishat Punjabi Chinioti West Punjab/ Chiniot Lyallpur ------ 
Hoti Pathan Landlord Charsadda Charsadda Charsadda 
Fateh Marwari Gujurat Karachi ----- 
Isphani (None) Iranian Karachi Calcutta 
Karim Bohras Bombay Karachi ----- 
Habib Khoja Isnasheri Bombay Karachi   Bombay 
Hyeson (None) Madras Karachi   Madras 
   Source: Kochanek (1983) 
 
Table 2 shows that of the top 18 business groups, six belonged to Punjab and eight were situated in Karachi 
including the Memon, Khojas and Dawood families. Out of these 18 business groups, three did not belong to any 
community and had no background in business or trade, pre-partition. From the other two provinces of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan, there was only one business group, owned by a landlord. Table 2 also indicates that 
although Punjab had a number of business groups, these were not landlord-turned-corporate elites; rather, they 
had a history of being in business in Delhi, Calcutta and Lahore. 
Most of these business groups were associated with the cotton industry (West Pakistan) or jute industry (East 
Pakistan). When Pakistan came into being, there were only 16 textile companies out of which only 12 were in 
operation. It grew to 70 in 1957 as industrial development took place. By 2013, there were 596 textile mills out of 
which 442 were in operation. The export revenue of the textile industry contributed a large share to the GDP of 
Pakistan. Kochanek (1983) noted that the fastest growing families were not the Isphahanis, Haroon or Rahimtoola7, 
but Dawood, Saigol, Jalil (Amin), Adamjee, Shaikh, Fancy, Valika, Bawany, Bashir (Crescent) and Wazir Ali. The 
political leaders of the Muslim League traditionally kept business and politics separate (Kochanek, 1983). 
The business groups selected as case studies in next chapter represent each industrial community. The Dawood 
Group represents the Memon group, which had a strong business background in Bombay, while the Sehgal group 
is a Punjabi sheikh group from Calcutta, now settled in Lahore. To represent a group which has no community 
backing, but came up as a strong group, the Wazir Ali group was selected, now known as the Packages Group8. A 
group which had community links but no business background before the partition is the Nishat Group, located in 
Faisalabad. These groups are diverse in nature, representing all communities, based in all three industrial cities and 
have had different levels of historical support from the state. 
                                                          
7 These were the leading business groups at the time of the creation of Pakistan. The Isphanai Group held the proud tag of launching Orient Air Ways which later became the 
national air carrier, Pakistan International Airline (PIA). The Raheemtoola group was originally based in Bombay and was involved in trading since the late 19th century as well as in 
politics. Sir Ibrahim Rahimtoola was Mayor of Bombay and first Indian Speaker of the Indian Imperial Parliament. His son, Habib Ibrahim Rahimtoola was a close associate of 
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan. Habib served Pakistan as its first High Commissioner to the United Kingdom in 1947. The Haroon Group was also closely linked 
with Jinnah and the Pakistan Movement. The founder of this group, Abdullah Haroon, was a British Indian politician who contributed to nurturing Muslims in economic, 
educational, social and political fields in South Asia. Later, his son Yousaf Haroon, founder of the Dawn Group, played an active role with Jinnah in the Pakistan Movement. 
8 Famous as Packages Group, after its leading packaging firm, Packages Limited.  
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3. Road Map of Corporate Elite to Expand From 1947-1970 
This section explains in detail the effect of different policies adopted by democratic and authoritarian 
governments in Pakistan from 1947 till 1970. How the corporate elite changed their strategies and adapted to 
policy decisions will be highlighted in the discussion. This needs to be understood in light of the situation of 
resource allocation to the corporate sector under each regime.  
 
3.1. Emergence of Corporate elite in First Bureaucratic Regime, 1947-58 
The Pakistani government followed a liberal trade policy to strengthen newly-established business groups. 
Businesses incentives were offered to secure investments. This trade policy of the first bureaucratic regime focused 
on establishing facilities for the processing of domestically produced raw materials. The reason for focusing on 
these industries was because Pakistan was able to produce agriculture products some 50 to 70 percent cheaper than 
global prices. By the 1950s, Pakistan’s agriculture industries were one of the largest and cheapest. The profits 
earned from this industry allowed for the import of advanced manufacturing units to further industrialization. 
Pakistan sought to transition from exporting cheap raw materials and importing finished goods made by the same 
raw material at a high price to manufacturing final goods. This push for industrialization came at the expense of 
the landlords and the agriculture sector. Papanek (1962) noted that development of the industrial sector was due to 
four major reasons:  
1. The government’s ability to maintain law and order and prevent massive capital flight by enforcing import 
controls and providing overhead facilities. 
2. A small proportion of the population was accustomed to responding to market incentives. 
3. Institutions and value systems were supportive of entrepreneurial activities.  
4. A political system which did not get unduly worried by high prices, high profits and the presence of foreign 
enterprises.  
Table 3 presents the expansion of industrial assets from 1947 to 1959. The value of investments in the 
corporate sector increased tenfold, from Rs.580 million to Rs.5020 million. This expansion indicated the gap in the 
economy waiting to be tapped by businesses. Papanek (1962) developed an index to explain the growth of 
industrial assets. This index indicated an almost six-fold expansion of industrial assets within ten years, from 1949 
to 1959 see Table 3. This meant that investments were increasing in both the manufacturing sector and industrial 
assets. 
 
Table-3. Growth of Industrial Assets, 1947–1959. 
Year Million (Rs.) Index 
1947 580 17 
1949 820 23 
1951 1280 36 
1953 2030 57 
1955 3510 100 
1957 4360 124 
1959 5020 143 
Source: Papanek (1962). 
 
From 1953 to 1960, manufacturing had grown more rapidly in Pakistan than in any other country according to 
the United Nations’ statistics, except for Japan. Papanek (1964) Conducted a survey in 1960-61 involving a lengthy 
questionnaire completed by 255 industrialists belonging to different geographical areas. They were, according to 
the Census of Manufacturing Industry (CMI), 8 percent of the total 3170 firms at that time. Papanek’s study 
provided primary data derived from the survey and census report and offered evidence of a phenomenal increase in 
the industrialization of Pakistan in the first decade, from 1947 to 1957. However, that industrialization was 
concentrated in West Pakistan. This is evident in Table 4 derived from a study by Guisinger (1976) about the 
industrialization pattern that followed the early years. 
 
Table-4. Pattern of Industrialization in Pakistan, 1950-70. 
Factors                                                All Pakistan                                  West Pakistan 
Structural characteristics 1950 1960 1970 1970 
Per capita GNP 65 75 100 110 
Population (million) 80 100 130 60 
Share of Industry (expected) .12 .13 .17 .16 
Share of Industry (actual) .07 .12 .16 .21 
           Source: Guisinger (1976). 
 
Table 4 outlines industrial expansion in Pakistan in the first twenty years. It shows that an under-developed 
country lacking industrial firms as well as skilled human resources in labour and at managerial levels could find 
methods to progress. Pakistan did make the world wonder about its industrial development. Growth was primarily 
because a group of private entrepreneurs were ready to take the risk and initiative to invest and they showed an 
ability to efficiently organize the required capital and skilled manpower. These early entrepreneurs competed little 
with each other because of the ample market opportunities that were available. Competition arises when companies 
face saturation, which was not the case with Pakistan in its early days. Moreover, local and international markets 
were open and these entrepreneurs did not face the problem of excess supply. This could only happen as the market 
gave them space to flourish and take advantage of growing international and national demand. 
According to the approach developed by Maniruzzaman (1966), Chinroy, Soligo (Lewis, 1965) and others, the 
growth pattern of industrialization can be attributed to import-substitution, export expansion and domestic 
demand. The Korean War brought wealth to Pakistan. Businesses sold raw materials to the anti-communist 
nations and then invested their profits in the manufacturing of consumer goods.  
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A number of reasons account for Pakistan’s rapid economic growth soon after independence: the favourable 
impact of growth in the world economy, the liberalization policy of the 1950s, the economic role of the state and 
the mobilization of savings (Ahmad, 1959; Baqai, 1979; Amjad, 1982). These factors played a role but cannot be 
considered as major reasons for the massive expansion of the industrial sector. The core reason was the role of the 
state involving its capacity to increase investments in manufacturing firms by allocating resources for projects 
which were essential for development (McCartney, 2011). Industrialization was further generated with the re-
investment of profits, including those accruing from trade. Industries were initially established by funds derived 
from approximately 40 percent of trade profits. Only 10 percent of finances came from commercial banks. As 
Papanek (1962) noted, dominant family-owned businesses allowed an enterprise to go public after they had 
skimmed off the high profits of the earlier years, providing them with funds for new investments in high profit 
areas. The most important source of financing was reinforced earnings, which provided almost half of the industrial 
investments between 1958 and 1959. 
The corporate elites who could exploit this gap were old business groups as well as the small traders who were 
emerging as businessmen. The main problem for industrial development was the huge foreign exchange required 
to establish such enterprises in Pakistan. This was generated from the export of jute, produced in East Pakistan. 
However, the collusions between corporate and bureaucratic elites of West Pakistan hindered this foreign 
exchange from being invested for further industrial expansion in East Pakistan. This ignited tensions between East 
and West Pakistan from the early 1950s, a situation created by elites.  
In the mid-1950s, Prime Minister Suharwardy tried to reduce this tension by sanctioning more import licenses 
to East Pakistan’s corporate groups and by allotting aid for the modernization of ill-equipped industries. However, 
West Pakistan’s business groups did not accept it and sent a protest about this to President Iskandar Mirza. The 
corporate elite of West Pakistan took advantage of the rifts between President Mirza and Prime Minister 
Suharwardy by seeking an alliance with the former  (Maniruzzaman, 1966). This alliance became one reason for the 
overthrow of Suharwardy. This resulted in the short-lived interim government of Chandigarh (7 October 1957 to 
16 December 1957) who cancelled all import licenses and grants awarded to East Pakistan. A similar situation 
occurred under Prime Minister Noon’s regime (16 December 1957 to 7 October 1958), before Martial Law was 
imposed by General Ayub in October 1958. The early collusions and contestations among corporate and political 
elites played a significant role in shaping the business structure of current Pakistan. 
The bureaucratic elite also played a significant role in these collusions. Bureaucrats had complete autonomy to 
allocate funds and award licenses to industrialists as well as brief them about future business decisions such as 
where to expand and what to produce. This policy of offering incentives to develop the industrial sector continued 
until the 1960s. This policy did not lead to equitable growth, but resulted in concentration of wealth by certain 
groups. As the import licenses and approvals to establish industrial enterprises were controlled by the bureaucratic 
elite, they issued those contracts to corporate elites with whom they had personal contacts. By the mid-1950s, 
corporate groups owned major financial sectors like banks9 and insurance houses. Financial capital was thus easily 
available to them, compared to other emerging groups. This environment created by government and some 
business groups proved a major problem for new entrants in the corporate sector attempting to establish 
businesses.  
 
3.2. Corporate Elite Expansion under Military Regime 
In the 1960s, Pakistan had a mixed economy model in which the state set up industries that were later 
transferred to private businesses. The pursuit of profit inspired these private businessmen to invest and expand in 
other sectors of the economy. Economic reforms were initiated in agriculture, education, law, land, trade and 
taxation. The initial results were quite spectacular and the model attracted academics as well as policy-makers from 
other countries. One of the distinguishing features of the mixed economic model was that Pakistan had a strong 
bureaucracy that guided and directed the private sector. The Planning Commission of the 1960s was a powerful 
technocratic institution assisted by foreign economic experts. Corruption and parochial interests had not permeated 
the higher levels of decision-making to the degree that it subverted economic progress and institution building.  
Though this industrial development increased GDP, it could not be sustained and growth was not distributed 
evenly. As discussed, during the military regime led by General Ayub arose the issue of wealth concentration in the 
hands of a few families. Society was clearly divided between elites and the lower and middle classes. Since the 
middle class was emerging in this era, and as Ayub was a follower of modernization, this allowed intellectuals and 
the middle class to articulate their thoughts in public forums. These forums became the reason for Ayub’s fall. 
Wilcox (1970) however, was of the view that the reason for Ayub’s fall was primarily due to disputes that arose 
among military elites. Inequitable forms of development led to political decisions based on the vested interests of 
those holding power. In this situation, even risk-taking entrepreneurs stepped back from investing or moved to 
other countries, especially after the government’s nationalisation policy began.  
On a related point, since Ayub’s regime, the military had developed an independent corporate empire. Siddiqa 
(2007) argues that to ensure control of power, military elites always desired to expand their economic interest. One 
example of state patronage was the accusation that Ayub had awarded numerous rents to his son, Gouhar Ayub, 
and his father-in-law, to help set up Gandhara Industries.  
Khandker (1973) measured Pakistan’s income distribution in the first twenty years and found more unequal 
distribution of income in urban areas compared to rural areas. He also argued that there was increased inequality of 
wealth in the form of corporate industrial assets. He found that a mere 47 stockholders owned 100 percent of 
corporate assets. These 47 stockholders consisted of 14 groups and 33 individuals see Table 5.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 For example, the Muslim Commercial Bank was owned by the Adamjee group, United Bank by Kohinoor Group and Allied Bank by the Khawaja group. 
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Table-5. Distribution of number of principle stockholders and total assets by size, 1970. 
Number of Principle stocks            Total Assets 
Size of Assets Single Group Total % Single Co. 
Million Rs. 
Group Million 
Rs 
Total 
Million Rs 
% 
Less than 25 10 - 10(10) 21 149 - 149 3 
25-50 11 1(2) 12(13) 26 364 147 411 10 
50-100 9 3(6) 12(15) 26 604 272 876 20 
100-150 2 4(9) 6(11) 13 255 539 794 18 
150-200 1 1(3) 2(4) 4 190 152 342 8 
200-300 - 2(5) 2(5) 4 - 483 483 11 
300-400 - 2(9) 2(9) 4 - 654 654 15 
400-above - 1(4) 1(4) 2 - 621 621 15 
Total - 14(38) 47(71) 100 - 2768 2768 100 
Notes: Values in brackets present the total number of companies. 
Source: Khandker (1973). 
 
Thirty four stockholders (with less than 100 million rupees) owned 33 percent of assets, 10 stockholders (with 
100 to 300 million rupees) owned 37 percent and three stakeholders (with above 300 million rupees) owned 30 
percent. This concentration of wealth allowed these business groups to indulge in illegal activities to expand their 
businesses. Papanek (1962) contends that investors offered bribes and were even willing to pay a legal surcharge of 
over 100 percent to import machinery.  
Concentration of wealth among the big 22 families proved that power games had been played to enhance the 
personal interests of elites. In spite of high growth rates, people were unhappy with the military government and 
the middle class, specifically university youths who started voicing the need for equal rights and opportunities for 
everyone. Many reasons can be attributed for the fall of Ayub’s government. One of the reasons was the decision to 
withdraw from the 1965 war, after the Tashkand agreement10. Although Ayub blamed Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (then 
Pakistan’s Foreign Minister) for this11, his accusation later fuelled Bhutto’s success in the elections. Bhutto’s main 
issue in the 1970 elections was the plight of youths and the working class whose votes made him the next Prime 
Minister. Bhutto’s major support was from West Pakistan. In East Pakistan, support was primarily for Mujeeb Ur 
Rehman12. Given the conflicts between the military and Mujeeb, the latter helped Bhutto to become the Prime 
Minister13. The reason the military was in conflict with Mujeeb was his continuous pressure on Ayub regarding the 
latter’s six point agenda which did not entail giving him regional autonomy. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The two main strategies adopted by a business group to expand were, first by creating family links with each 
other; this also served as a means to secure connections with other power elites. Through this method, the 
corporate elite also obtained the benefit of becoming a double elite, securing their position in different domains. 
This was observed in the links between the Nishat and Kohinoor Groups. Through marriage ties, the Kohinoor 
Group secured access to state rents because of the political contacts that Mian Mansha of Nishat Group had with 
Nawaz Sharif.   
Second, the expansion and evolution of business groups had implications on politics under different regimes. 
Domestic politics was deeply shaped by foreign affairs and the role of international elites in Pakistan. General Ayub 
provided strong support to newly-emerging industrialists and helped them become corporate elites. This act of 
developing corporate elites was aided by international affairs which in turn enhanced the economic and political 
influence of business groups. The Korean War and the spread of Communism in Asia drew America to Pakistan, 
enhancing General Ayub’s position. Ayub used this opportunity to strengthen the position of the military elite, 
while foreign aid and investments helped expand the industrial sector. Bhutto’s nationalization policy was also not 
an act taken in isolation. As the world was moving towards a socialist approach to development, Bhutto’s leftist and 
populist policy agenda became the reason for winning elections and the country came under the control of a 
democratic government 
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